Self-Disclosure and Voluntary Ghettoization within Twitter: Turkish Users Example*

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Abstract: This study, which acknowledges Twitter as an urban space where social interactions take place, also perceives "echo-chamber" problem as "voluntary ghettoization" and aims to describe it in association with "self-disclosure" concept, which means disclosure of cultural, political, or ethnic identities via the symbols that refer to them. Therefore, adopting cyber ethnography technique, the symbols encountered on participants' Twitter profile pages have been documented and the followers of the participants have been analyzed correlatively. It has been determined that the users disclose their identities, form more homogeneous and ghetto-like networks.

1. Introduction

Internet, social media, and social networking sites (SNSs), which were emerged as hopes against fragmentation related to identities of the city or the mass media, and which took on the task of the restoration of the public sphere, seem to reproduce all this fragmentation today. These fragmentations are often discussed by the concepts such as "echo-chambers" or "balkanization", however, since the SNSs are not only tools of media but also domains where social interactions take place, they might be perceived pursuant to the social, urban, and interaction theories. Here emerges the "cyber voluntary ghetto" concept which perceives the homogeneous networks formed by SNS users as homogeneous neighborhoods, which are exact opposites of the "public." Similar to the spatial "ghettos" or "gated communities", cyber ghettos are also about identities, cultural, political, or ethnic groups, and formed highly associated with

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the "disclosure" or "presentation" of these identities with the "symbols" that refer to them.

This study mainly aims to describe the association between "self-disclosure" and "ghettoization" within the SNS called Twitter, which might be acknowledged quite "public" among its kind. Hence, the study firstly establishes a framework with both social and media theories. Thereafter, adopting qualitative methods and cyber ethnography technique, the study first describes the symbols encountered (since the Turkish Twitter users have highly symbolic profile pages), secondly describes "self-disclosure" attempts, and finally demonstrates cyber voluntary ghettos within Turkish users. It must be noted that this study does not have a representative sample and only aims to describe the current situation.

2. Twitter as a Sociable Public Sphere

The concept of "public sphere", which has been discussed for many years by numerous disciplines, is perceived and described in many other ways. Besides the primary meaning of the concept, which is "being open to everyone", it also refers to a domain where political or social, collective or individual vis-a-vis interactions take place. However, in the media and communication studies, the concept is often perceived that it only covers organized political actions and rational debates, thanks to the liberal theories and Habermas' conceptualization.

According to liberal theories, which are known with the theoreticians such as J. Locke, J. S. Mill, the public/private distinction should be between state administration and market economy, in other words, "public" means "government", government's policies, and debates about "general interest" which is principally government's interests (Weintraub, 1997: 7-8). The media as a liberal public sphere takes on the task of "informing the citizens" transparently about the policies (or debates about the policies) of the government, and simply put, the informed citizens may choose the best policies for them. As understood, no vis-a-vis interaction plays part in this theory, citizens may only follow the previously chosen "interactions" from media, and most of these interactions are organized political.

On the other hand, Habermas (1974) has separated the "public sphere" from state or government, envisioned it as a domain between state and private economy (p. 50), and also considered vis-a-vis interactions, yet these interactions are principally political intentional or performed by organized political groups. Moreover, according to

Habermas, "public" means "general interests" alike the liberal theories claim, while they are not the interests of the governments but "common" interests of "private" people. As he puts it: "Citizens behave as a public body when they confer ... about matters of general interest" (p. 49).

There are also theories that do not perceive "public" as "general interests" still refer to principally political interactions, which may not be required to be "organized". Arendt (1998), for instance, acknowledges "public" equal to "political" while "household" equal to "private", with the words: "The distinction between a private and public sphere of life corresponds to the household and the political realms" (p. 28), however, she puts conflicts forward rather than "rational debates" or "compromise" by defining the public sphere as a domain "where one could excel, could distinguish oneself from all others" (p. 49). Likewise, the feminist, Marxist or poststructuralist, that is to say, counter-public theoreticians also acknowledge "public" equal to "political", yet aim to redefine dominant public/private distinction (Weintraub, 1997: 27-33). They perceive "private" as neither "household" nor "non-government", but claim that the household is also "public", therefore political. Within the idea of "personal is political", as Fraser (1990) puts it; "assumptions that were previously exempt from contestation will now have to be publicly argued out" (p. 67). As is seen, both Arendt and counter-public theoreticians refer to vis-a-vis interactions, which do not need to include compromise efforts, yet are performed by organized political intentions.

In substance, except liberal theories, all other public sphere narratives refer to vis-a-vis interactions. However, is "public sphere" required to cover only political interactions that are often performed by (or in associated with) organized or macro political groups? Against all these "organized political" narratives there stands sociable public sphere narrative, which is about the domain where vis-a-vis (or micro) casual social interactions and everyday life practices take place. "Its domain lies, after all, in the public space of street, park, and plaza -but also of neighborhood, bar, and café" (Weintraub, 1997: 23). All these "casual" interactions do not have to be "non-political", on the contrary, if "the personal is political" as the counter-public theoreticians claim, these interactions are probably political, however, they may not politically intentional. People, that navigate the streets, parks, and plazas of the city (that is to say, "public sphere") encounter (ocular) or occasionally interact (discursive) with each other, therefore, construct and reconstruct both themselves and the social setting. Social practices and significations are created by casual interactions, as Göle (2002: 176) puts it: "As a social imaginary, the public sphere works in a social field and penetrates and blends into cultural significations."

For sure, in both political and sociable perspectives, the public sphere is highly associated with heterogeneity, differences, and different social, cultural, ethnic, ideological, economic groups. Without different social groups or world-views exist, neither political "rational debates", "excellence attempts" and "struggles to be visible" are significant nor are the new significations created through casual interactions. In Arendt's (1998) words: "Action, ... corresponds to the human condition of plurality" (p. 7), without "plurality" there would be no "action". The city, where the sociable public domain mainly lies, is also described with heterogeneity almost by all urban theoreticians. As Sennett (2002) simply puts it: city "... is a human settlement in which strangers are likely to meet" (p. 39).

Returning to the subject, as is mentioned, the public sphere concept is often perceived that it only covers organized political actions and rational debates especially in the media and communication studies, however, it may -even it must- be perceived by its sociable means. Normatively, internet, social media, and SNSs are public spheres for sure since they are open to and reachable by everyone. Moreover, there are numerous discussions whether SNSs (or Twitter) are kind of public spheres or not, which often adopt liberal theories or Habermas' concepts (Rasmussen, 2014; Schafer, 2015). What is more, Fuchs (2014) criticizes the theoreticians such as Papacharissi or Castells for concentrating on cultural/political communication and ignoring political-economic aspects of the cyber public spheres, even if they principally focused on freedom of political expressions through the internet. There are also numerous studies that adopt counter-public theories and focus on the visibility attempts of the "sub-classes" through the internet or SNSs in the context of "digital activism" (Saka, 2012). By any means, there are fewer studies that perceive the internet and SNSs as sociable public spheres, which is a perspective is not principally political but also does not have to exclude all political actions. This is a perspective that acknowledges the internet and SNSs as cities, which consist of squares, streets, and of course neighborhoods, where cyber vis-a-vis encounters or interactions take place, and significations or social setting created.

Eventually, "Cyber-space architecture is very similar to the physical architecture", "SNSs imitate real everyday life" and "Vis-a-vis interactions are often replaced by online interactions" (Çomu & Halaiqa, 2015: 30), therefore, cyber public spheres may be interpreted pursuant to urban, interaction, and everyday life theories and analogies. Furthermore, there are also a couple of media or internet theoreticians who consider especially the social interactions within the concept of public sphere. For instance, Keane (1995: 8) defines the public sphere as "relationship between to or more people,

usually connected by certain means of communication ..., in which nonviolent controversies erupt." Similarly, Dahlgren (2005: 148) claims "public sphere is ... a constellation of communicative spaces ... that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates" and while categorizing it in dimensions, describes the "dimension of interaction" with everyday life practices.

Twitter, is not only a macro, liberal, or Habermasian public sphere, since it shines out during political movements (Eren, 2015; Korkmaz, 2015), is a medium that citizen are informed "transparently" about politics, and a domain where macro political debates may take place through "trending topics" table (Malkoç, 2018), but also a micro or sociable public sphere, since its users may encounter (ocularly) or interact (discursively) with the other users, that are similar to them or not, while navigating its heterogeneous cyber squares, streets or homogeneous cyber neighborhoods, therefore, they construct or reconstruct themselves, significations, life practices, and the social setting.

3. Twitter Profile Pages: Self Presentation or Self-Disclosure

One of the arch dichotomies of the concept of the public sphere is the dichotomy of the "collectivity" and "visibility" (Weintraub, 1997: 5), which is again associated with private/ public distinction. While the "collectivity" notion refers to the rational debates and compromise, the "visibility" notion is about the struggles of the people who previously excluded from public sphere. While the theoreticians of "collectivity" claim that individual (that is to say "private") aspects or interest should be kept away from the public sphere since they prevent compromise and even interactions, the theoreticians of "visibility" oppose this idea and claim "private" aspects are also "public" since they previously had been suppressed.

"Collectivity" notion is represented by liberal and Habermasian theories. As mentioned before, liberal theories simply advocate that subjects that are not about the state or macro politics should be kept away from public sphere. Similarly, Habermas (1974), who imagines the public sphere between the state and private economy, pushes individual interests or aspects into the background by defining the public sphere as "... a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed" (p. 49); "opinion" here, is related to the lifestyle of a person, while "public opinion" is "general opinion" constituted by the opinion owners through rational debates (1991: 90-95). On the other hand, "Visibility" notion is represented by counter-public or Arendt's theories, as mentioned before, Arendt perceives public

sphere in association with "excellence" and "to be distinguished from others." Similarly, Fraser (1990: 67), who is a counter-public theoretician, defines "subaltern counter publics" as the domain of "Members of the subordinated social groups–women, workers, people of color, and gays and lesbians" which produce "counter discourses", and encourages them to be visible in the "public" with all their differences.

Recall that, these visibility and collectivity narratives often refer to organized political groups, while sociable public sphere narratives refer to casual interactions that are independent of political organizations' intentions but may also be performed by individual political intentions. For instance, Göle (2002) points to Muslim women, who may be acknowledged as people excluded from the dominant public sphere at least for Europe or USA, and perceives their existence in public with their headscarves on as visibility attempts. These attempts are political for sure, but they are also individual, casual, and construct social setting "naturally."

As is understood, public sphere of the city "provides a stage for performance rather than an abstract frame for textual and discursive practices, the ocular aspect in the creation of significations ... becomes of utmost importance" (p. 177). According to Simmel (1997), in the modern world the eyes have won out over the ears, "the individuals see each other ... but cannot speak" (p. 117) In other words, people encountering today are looking at each other rather than listening to, and individual aspects or interests are mostly presented or disclosed via visual (ocular) symbols rather than aural (discursive). Here the "symbol" concept should be described. Goffman (1990) described the information about an individual –who is of course not only an "individual" considering the cultural, political or economic milieu s/he dwells– as "social information" and called the signs that convey social information as "symbols" (pp. 58-59). Symbols mostly refer to social groups, political stances, ethnic origins, nations, religious beliefs, etc., In Simmel's (1898) words; "the coherence of the group ... attaches itself to a material symbol" (p. 675), and no interpretations are required to discover what they refer to.

Symbols are agents of self-presentation. Goffman (1956), who perceives social interactions as playacting, called the "part of the individual's performance ... functions to define the situation for those who observe" (p. 13) as "front", and underlined that individuals design these fronts, the spaces (settings) or their bodies (personal fronts), with the most appropriate symbols to present themselves and get favourable impressions (pp. 66-70). "Self-presentation" notion is not a critical approach and only provides a method to analyze vis-a-vis interaction processes, while Sennett's

"self/personality disclosure" concept may be perceived as a criticism of public sphere mentality of the post-modern era. Sennett's concept is based on his historical perspective.

According to Sennett (2002) the 18th-century bourgeois city provided an "anonymous" and "public" scene where "strangers" were perceived not as threats but as a natural part of urban life, and "general interests" perceived far more important than individual interests. Sennett, alike Goffman, acknowledged the bourgeois city as a theater scene whose citizens are "public" actors; "There is nonetheless a strong relationship between stage and street" (p. 38). The actors, to maintain the theatre (that is to say "public interactions"), appeared on the stage by putting on their "social masks" which hide their individual interests, personalities or identities behind. These masks were not about tricking the others but functioned as bridge builders between the actors, and "This bridge, in turn, gave men the means to be sociable, on impersonal grounds" (p. 64). The 18th-century bourgeoisie had a "body as mannequin", wore tailored clothes, and "speech as sign", interacted with a civic and gentle language; "Both visual and verbal principles therefore sharpen a definition of 'public' expression: it is anti-symbolic" (p. 87). In other words, alike Habermas, Sennett idealizes the 18th-century bourgeoisie, who did not disclose their private life, intimacy, and personalities for the maintenance of the public life and general interests, on that sense, he is a "collectivity" theoretician. He also mentions a distinction between "presenting" and "representing"; while "presenting" means being behind a social mask, hiding individual aspects, "representing" means taking off the mask and disclosing personality, which is related to social, cultural, political, ethnic groups the person belongs and erodes the public sphere (p. 42).

The 18th-century city, where personalities and personal interests were hidden behind "social masks" for the maintenance of interactions and "rational" debates, would be "modernize" in the beginning of the 20th-century and have a "grey" climate where neither personalities nor the interactions or debates exist. Simmel (1971) noted that the metropolis "... has outgrown every personal element" (pp. 337). As it is known; in the modern society and city, traditional, communal, and close ties have eroded, while rationalism, money, and calculability have risen, and the people losing their community bonds to maintain their individual interests have merged in a flat and "grey" appearance (p. 329), alienated, or turned into "strangers." "We live among strangers, among whom we are strangers ourselves" (Bauman & May, 2001: 39). The modern people of the 20th-century, who broke free from their bonds at first, would start to fear to live among strangers, seek the ways of "escaping from freedom", and try to sew

new bonds in the mid-20th-century (Fromm, 1965). However, in the postmodern era, both the city and the society lost their "grey" and anonymous character, while heterogeneity and difference emerged as "liberative forces" (Harvey, 1990: 9). People with their new bonds, that is to say, identities, have started to "freely" disclose themselves.

Sennett (2002) tracks the roots of identity or personality disclosure problem at the beginning of the 19th-century. According to Sennett, while the citizens of the 18th-century city did not disclose their personal differences each other at the first place; in the 19th-century they lost these aspects due to cities' growing economy and population (pp. 141-146). Standardization of mass production objects (that is to say "uniformity of objects", decreasing options, and certain objects that become obtainable by certain classes/groups only) have put the selves/personalities/identities ahead and made "playacting" unnecessary, "As the images become more monochromatic, people began to take them more seriously, as signs of the personality of the wearer" (p. 164). Thus, people started to discover each other's social classes, identities or personalities via their appearances, and the once "anti-symbolic" bourgeois city has been invaded by the symbols that refer to identities or personalities. This has led to today's society, which is defined as "intimate society" by Sennett, and based on identity or personality disclosure (p. 29).

Returning to subject, could Twitter profile pages be perceived in consideration of "self-presentation" and "personality disclosure" concepts? Since Twitter is acknowledged in this study as a sociable public sphere and associated with the spaces of city such as squares, streets, and neighborhoods, it is likely to say, the profile pages are faces, clothes, rooms, office tables, in Goffman's terms "settings" or "personal fronts" of the users, who navigate this cyber-city. Users present themselves by designing these cyber "fronts", their cover and profile pictures with the most appropriate symbols to get favorable impressions, that is to say "followers" and "likes." Or perhaps, in Sennett's term, they do not "present" but "represent" themselves (the social, cultural, political, ethnic groups they belong to), and also not wear their "social masks" but wear "community masks." And here the main problem of this study emerges, do personality disclosure on the SNS profile pages cause cyber ghettoization, that may be acknowledged as users belong to similar (or same) social groups dwell in the same network? However, for sure, the disclosure attempts could also be acknowledged as "visibility" attempts, as the struggles of "excellence" or "counter-public."

4. The Echo-Chambers or Cyber Voluntary Ghettos within Twitter

The problem, which may be described as fragmentation of the internet users from different cultural, ethnic groups, economic classes, have different political stances or ideologies, support different sports clubs, like different music or literature genres, or as the users ignore the others due to the homogeneous networks they form, has been discussed by numerous researchers or theoreticians within the concepts such as "echo-chambers", "homophily", "balkanization", and "polarization." However, the problem is hardly discussed in the context of urban or everyday life theories, despite this perspective might be remarkably effective to acknowledge the causes or processes of this fragmentation. Since Twitter has been acknowledged in this study as a sociable public sphere and with the analogies refer to the city, it is likely to say, the networks users form might be perceived as homogeneous neighborhoods, and the trending topic table, for instance, might be perceived as a heterogeneous city center. As mentioned above, users navigate these cyber neighborhoods and city centers with their cover and profile pictures by "disclosing" themselves with the "symbols" they use to design these "fronts." Might all these "echo-chamber", "balkanization", "polarization", or let us say "ghettoization" problems be related to the "disclosure" problem?

Actually, the historical processes the city and the internet go through, that comes from anonymity and goes to the identity disclosure, are quite similar. The city, that provided a public scene in 18th-century as Sennett claims, and "grey" and anonymous at the beginning of the 20th-century as Simmel mentions, has lost its both anonymous and public character and heterogeneity and difference emerged as "liberative forces" since the mid-20th-century as Harvey notes. In the 20th-century city started to overflow with "strangers", and according to Sennett (2002), the people chose to become "intimate" and "local" to escape from strangers and alienation (p. 295). Describing the 20th-century city as a "life among the strangers", Bauman (2001: 46-47) also points out that people needed shelters, that are "familiarity" and "security" of the communities, from "the stranger." Seeking for familiars among the stranger means seeking "people of us", and finding those of us could likely be possible when they disclose "with whom they are", the social, cultural, political, ethnic groups they belong to, and this process often functions on a symbolic domain. Only seeking or trying to find "familiars", the "people of us", has eventually caused certain social groups to settle in certain spaces/regions of the city and the city has been divided/fragmented between identities. For sure, this process cannot be reduced to "preferences"; In the early 20th-century, city centers, where immigrants and sub-economic classes lived before, have got converted into economic centers, gentrified, and sub-classes have got

isolated outer regions of cities (Alver, 2007: 24-38). The isolated different social groups, immigrants, were associated with crime, and their surroundings have been tried to close further, and the concept of "ghetto" came forth.

The ghetto concept primarily explains the spaces that have occurred with the immigration process, and a ghetto is a place that represents a homogenized culture closed to outside (p. 67). Bauman (2001) also refers to the concept of "closure"; "A ghetto ... combines spatial confinement with social closure" (p. 116) and "Ghettos are places from which their insiders cannot get out" (p. 117) However, in the end of 20th-century the course of the fragmentation of the city between identities has changed and ghetto became "voluntary"; "Crime, crowd, insecurity ... shows that the spatial fragmentation is a necessity" (Alver, 2007: 105) and the middle-upper classes have started to close themselves to "gated communities" to escape from insecurity, for sure in accordance with their identities. This new closure, which Alver defines as "the ghettos of the rich" (p. 68), is conceptualized by Bauman (2011: 117) as "voluntary ghettos" which aim to "bar outsiders from going in". Voluntary or involuntary, "The ghetto strictly reflects exclusion, closure, and homogeneity" (Alver, 2007: 69). The ghetto means "separation in lieu of the negotiation of life in common" (Bauman, 2001: 115). The ghetto means being "local" and "intimate", bears only "homogeneity" meaning of the community; in Sennett's (2002) words, "the purge of those who don't really belong becomes the community's business" (p. 261) In the ghetto, "community masks" becomes far more important than "social masks"; "The mask reveals a common mask; ... the faces of all to be recognizable in this common face, it must remain rigid and still" (p. 250).

When it comes to the mid-90s; the mass media has been fragmented, that is to say "tribalized" through identities (Morley & Robbins, 1995), therefore, the people have ignored the media that they do not belong to, and also the common areas of the city have diminished, therefore, the people have started to interact only with the "people of them" without even -being able to- leaving their neighborhoods. When that "publicless" atmosphere ruled, the internet and the social media have emerged as new tools and were seen as hopes and alternatives where one takes off her/his "community mask", interacts freely, and does not need to seek for "security", so that, the public life would have been restored (Timisi, 2005). For sure, these hopes are associated with the early anonymous atmosphere of the Internet, which is quite similar to the cities of 20th-century.

In this early period of the Internet, identities were able to be reconstructed merely by the language and eluded the biological symbols such as sex, origin, skin color that constructs them (pp. 97-102). This anonymity, which is similar to the Sennett's "social mask" concept, was approved due to its potential to form virtual communities where everyone is equal. The "virtual community" narrative imagined a community that is disconnected from the social context. As Rheingold (1993, introduction) puts it "Virtual communities are social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough." With this definition, Rheingold refers only to a group of random people who simply gathered on the internet.

In the mid-2000's, SNSs founded, therefore, being anonymous has become a marginal preference rather than the norm, and anonymous users have begun to be perceived as "strangers" or "insecure" people as in Bauman's narratives. Within the SNSs, users started to desire to show their faces since this environment "encourages users to upload a profile photo" (Boyd & Ellison, 2007: 211). In other words, with SNSs, people took off their "social masks", put on their identity masks, and started to disclose their personalities. In Goffman's terms, the physical fronts consist of set, decors and costumes has been replaced by the cyber-fronts consist of profile pages and variety of symbols placed on them as accessories.

Narratives of the loss of anonymity are mostly about the real names and faces, that is to say, "formal" identities, which are carried to the internet, however, the "identity" is also highly associated with "with whom the person is." In other words, disclosure of identity is also disclosure of the cultural backgrounds, the political stances, the ethnic origins, etc. SNS users have not only disclosed their real identities but they have also carried their offline environments and communities to online due to the architecture of the SNSs. As Boyd & Ellison point out SNSs "enable users to ... make visible their social networks" (p. 211). In other words, the concept of "virtual community", which was a community disconnected from the social context, has changed with SNSs and the internet has started to host "real" communities. Here; it should not be forgotten that the "real" communities had already been "ghettoized" in the context of the city or "tribalized" in the context of the media.

For sure, these "cyber communities" are not permitted only to those who are known offline and may expand with new "followers". These new followers would probably be the people who are similar to users' offline friends. Moreover, in the mid-2000's the internet environment started to overflow with the anonymous "strangers", similar to the 20th-century city, and the users become "local" or "intimate" to escape from the

strangers and alienation as Sennett stated, or started to see their own familiar networks as "shelters" as Bauman narrated. In other words, also for the internet users, the "security need" mentioned by Alver re-emerged, and the solution was choosing to "live" among the similar ones again. As Van Dijk (2006) puts it internet users would "invite particular people to withdraw into computer communication ... to interact only with safe, self-chosen social environments" (p. 3). Seeking for familiarity among the stranger means seeking "people of us", and finding those of us could only be possible when they disclose "with whom they are", and this process often functions on a symbolic domain of profile pages. Today, it is observed that anonymity returns to the internet; the "real" faces and names may be more hidden than the times when the SNSs founded, however, the symbols of cultural backgrounds, ethnic origins, political stances, that is to say, symbols of "with whom the people are" take up more space on the profile pages than before. Today's SNS user constructs and expands her/his personal network with the users who disclose that they are "similar to her/him" by a variety of symbols, and keeps the others away as much as possible. Schmidt (2014) describes this phenomenon with the concepts of "personal publics" or "do-it-yourself publics."

Here comes the idea of the "cyber voluntary ghetto". If the ghetto reflect "exclusion", "closure" and "homogeneity"; these do-it-yourself networks are perceived as reflections of existing spatial ghettos. In other words, pursuant to Sennett and Bauman's concepts, the cyber voluntary ghetto is also about closure, purge of the others, barring and homogenization, and is also a kind of "cyber-localization" or "cyber-intimate society." In cyber ghetto, the "community masks" gets important, not the "social masks"; if the faces of all to be recognizable in this common "cyber-face", it must remain rigid and still. While the internet and SNSs were seen as hopes against spatial "ghettoization" or "tribalization" of the mass media and took on the task of the restoration of the "public sphere", they seem to reproduce all these fragmentations in the cyber-space today. While the "public sphere" is about heterogeneity, about "rational debates" or the "visibility" struggles of the different social groups in its political means, and about "signification" creation through the interactions of different social groups, these cyber ghetto-like homogeneous networks of today could be anything except "public."

5. Methods

5.1. Research Model

This study aims to generate data and describe personality disclosure, profile pages that are "fronts" and "symbols" that are accessories of this disclosure, and to examine whether this disclosure associated with cyber voluntary ghettoization or not, within the SNS called Twitter. Therefore, this study is a descriptive research that focuses on the question "how" rather than "why", and "presents a picture of the specific details of a situation, social setting, or relationship." (Neuman, 2014: 38-39). This study also adopts qualitative methods that aim to present and classify the qualitative data collected "by looking at the experiences of individuals within their everyday life practices" (Kümbetoğlu, 2012: 34-46).

5.2. Sampling

The study analyzes profile pages of the Twitter users and the symbols located there to describe the identity disclosure, and followers of the Twitter users to describe cyber ghettoization, therefore, it is "user-centered" (not "content-based") research. The study is not about a specific group on Twitter, in other words, its population could be considered as all "Twitter users in Turkey", which are about 14 million (We Are Social, 2016, slide 459). It is certain that analyzing random users encountered within Twitter generates insignificant data. After all, similar to the cities Twitter also consists of neighborhoods, even ghettos, that is to say, personal networks, therefore, to generate significant data and results it is necessary to analyze these different users and the networks they "live" in. Although the study does not aim to be representative, due to having the purposes to reach to the different identities on Twitter, the different symbolic presentations of these identities, the different symbols, and the different cyber ghettos have adopted purposive sampling method and tried to sample as many different participants as possible. To such sample; it has been determined to select the participants among the followers of Twitter accounts of Turkish newspapers that have distinctly different audiences; considering that the people polarized regard to the newspapers they read, and the newspaper accounts are the most followed institutional Twitter accounts in Turkey.

On October 10, 2017, participants selected among followers of the Twitter accounts of the Turkish newspapers BirGün (@Birgun_Gazetesi), Sözcü (@gazetesozcu) and Yeni Akit (@Yeniakit), which have distinctly different audiences, and on October 22, 2017, to represent a more "common" sphere, the followers of the Twitter account of the

Hürriyet newspaper (@Hurriyet) have been added to the sample.* Another issue is the criteria determined to select the participants; 1- To find the users, who are familiar with Twitter, accounts that have been active for at least 6 months have been scanned; 2- To find mediocre Twitter users, accounts that have followers between minimum 50 and maximum 1500 have been scanned; 3- To find users who are active enough and declare their own opinions, accounts tweeted (which is not a retweet) at least once in the previous week have been scanned; 4- Since the study has focused on "symbolic fronts" of Twitter and analyzed the "symbols" on profile pages, accounts with at least one image on their profile pages have been scanned. While scanning the followers of the newspapers' Twitter accounts, each newspaper's first forty (40) followers that match the criteria (160 user accounts in sum) were followed by the research account. Twenty-eight (28) users who did not want to participate has left the study, as they were informed before, by blocking the research account, and the remaining 132 participants have formed the sample.

Table 1. Participants and the Sample Groups

		Sample Groups (Newspaper Accounts)				SUM
		Hürriyet @Hurriyet	Yeni Akit @yeniakit	Sözcü @gazetesozcu	BirGün @BirGun_Gazetesi	
Count of Participants	F	33	32	33	34	132
	%	25.0	24.24	25.0	25.76	100

Table 1 shows the distributions of the 132 participants associated with the sample groups, a balanced distribution among the groups has been maintained. Moreover, participants have alphanumerically coded associated with the sample group they belong to (i.e. H3, A27, and S14).

5.3. Data Collection Technique and Analysis

The ethnographic method has been adopted to collect data for the study. The ethnographic method is an effort of describing a culture and understanding different styles of life, it "includes listening to and looking at the people. Data is noted down through field notes" (Alyanak, 2015: 118-119). Malinowski, one of the founders of the ethnographic method, stated that everyday activities, clothing, wares, etc. of the

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* The newspaper Sözcü, means "Spokesman" in English, is known with its republican, Kemalist, and nationalist tendencies. The newspaper BirGün, means "SomeDay" in English, is known with its left wing tendencies. The newspaper Yeni Akit, means "New Agreement" in English, is known with its Islamic religious and nationalist tendencies. And finally Hürriyet, means "Liberty" in English, is known as a mainstream newspaper, which has one of the most followed media accounts in Twitter, Turkey.

community observed/studied should also be noted down (p. 124). The clothing or the wares of the participants of the study, could be perceived as the symbols that they design their profile pages. It is necessary to mention here the method of "netnography" or "cyber ethnography." According to Kozinets, the founder of the method, netnography is a "qualitative research methodology that adapts ethnographic research techniques to study cultures and communities that are emerging through computer-mediated communications" (Akturan, 2009: 6).

The data of the study have been collected using the participatory observation technique of the ethnographic method; observation is defined as "to perceive and note down not only the momentary cases but also the cases that form patterns" (Kümbetoğlu, 2012:126), and observation notes and photographs are combined to put forth a "meaningful, detailed, holistic picture" (p.47). Accordingly; screenshots of all the participants' profile pages have been taken and all the "symbols" encountered have been noted down, counted, and grouped. This section aims to both describe Turkey's symbolic fronts of Twitter and demonstrate the symbols the researcher acknowledge as "symbols." Several examples of these symbols have been presented as qualitative findings. After, to reveal and describe the identity/personality disclosure on Twitter; participants have been categorized considering whether they use a real photograph (anonymous or not) and whether they have one of the symbols mentioned on their profile pages (with or without symbols). To extend the analysis, participants have been categorized as "Political Stance Declarers", "Sports Club Supporters" and "Vocational/Educational Declarers" considering the symbol groups they choose to design their profile pages. Finally, in order to describe the voluntary ghettoization on Twitter, firstly, the "Political Stance Declaration" category has been extended as "Republican Nationalists", "Conservative Nationalists", "Mere Nationalists", "Turkish Nationalism and Ethnicity", "Kurdish Nationalism and Ethnicity", "Socialists/Anarchists", "Islamic Religionists" and adding the "Sports Club Supporters", "Vocational/Educational Declarations" and "Participants Without Symbols" categories, participants' followers have been scanned to reveal how many followers of the participants use the same symbol groups to design their profile pages, that is to say, how homogenous the cyber neighborhood –their personal network– the participants "live" in. In this final section, the sample has been reduced as stratified considering the categories mentioned above, and 28% of the participants have been examined.

6. Findings and Comments

6.1. Symbolic Fronts of Twitter

"Symbols", that Simmel claimed that they refer to social groups, or Goffman described as conveyers of "social information"; are used for designing "settings" and "personal fronts" in Goffman's terms, but this time cyber fronts of profile pages. This study, just as an ethnography study that dive into a community and document locals' clothes and jewelleries, aims to document the visual or textual symbols that Twitter users design their profile pages with. The concept of "symbol" that the research adopts is shaped in the context of Sennett's concept of "identity/personality disclosure" and the symbols that refer to social, cultural, ethnic groups, religious beliefs, and political stances are documented.

In this regard, most common symbols that have been encountered through participants' profile pages are shown in Table 2. A total of 341 symbols have been encountered and only 196 of them (about 57.5%) could be shown in the table. Also, the explanations of which symbols are counted within the categories are given in parentheses. While 34.3% of all the symbols that have been encountered are used by the participants that follow the BirGün newspaper, only 14.4% are used by the participants that follow the Hürriyet newspaper. As is seen, the Hürriyet newspaper, which was chosen to represent a more common domain, remarkably appears to serve as a "public" sphere.

The most common symbol that the participants use on their profile pages is Turkish Flag with the count of 53 and 15.54% ratio. Turkish Flag is the national symbol of the Republic of Turkey, and it is not surprising to encounter it that much. Moreover, being a unifying symbol, this may also reinforce the hope of the public sphere. However, encountering 41.5% of the Flag among the participants that follow the Yeni Akit newspaper may shatter the hopes, since the symbol appears like belonging to a certain group. Several examples of The Turkish Flag symbols encountered are shown in Figure 1 with the codes of the participants.

Table 2. Most Common Symbols Encountered

SYMBOLS ENCOUNTERED		COUNT				SUM	%
		Sample Groups (Newspaper Acc.)					
		Hürri.	Y.Akit	Sözcü	Birgün		
Turkish Flag	F	6	22	11	14	53	15.54
	%	11.32	41.51	20.75	26.42		
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (*Founder of The Republic of Turkey*) (Portrait or image; sign; image of Atatürk's mausoleum; writings such as *"Atatürk"*, *"Mustafa Kemal Atatürk"*, *"Atatürkçü"*, *"Kemalist"*; Kemalist mottos; Atatürk's quotations.)	F	7	4	14	20	45	13.20
	%	15.56	8.89	31.11	44.44		
Islamic Symbols (*Sunni*) (Writings or mottos that refer to the religion such as *"İslam"*, *"Müslüman"*, *"Mümin"*, *"Allah"*; praying and verses in Turkish or Arabic; Images of mosques.)	F	4	14	3	1	22	6.45
	%	18.17	63.64	13.64	4.55		
Beşiktaş (*a Turkish football club*) (Images of club's coat of arm, shirt, stadium, colors; names or photographs of players; writings that refer to the club such as; "BJK", "1903")	F	3	1	–	16	20	5.87
	%	15.0	5.0	–	80.0		
Fenerbahçe (*a Turkish football club*) (Images of club's coat of arm, shirt, stadium, colors; names or photographs of players; writings that refer to the club such as; "Fenerbahçe", "Fenerli", "1907")	F	1	2	9	8	20	5.87
	%	5.0	10.0	45.0	40.0		
Mere writings that refer to Turkish ethnicity or nationalism such as; *"Turk", "Turkish", "Turkishness"*	F	1	4	6	8	19	5.57
	%	5.26	21.05	31.58	42.11		
Galatasaray (*a Turkish football club*) (Images of club's coat of arm, shirt, stadium, colors; names or photographs of players; writings that refer to the club such as; "Galatasaray", "1905")	F	–	2	5	10	17	4.99
	%	–	11.80	29.40	58.80		
Sum Total	F	49	87	88	117	341	100
	%	14.4	25.5	25.8	34.3		

Figure 1. Several Examples of Turkish Flag Symbols Encountered

The second most common symbol type used by participants are symbols refer to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is the founder of The Republic of Turkey, with the count of 45 and 13.2% ratio. Figure 2 shows several examples of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk symbols encountered on the profile pages of the participants and In Figure 3, several examples of sports club symbols encountered on the profile pages of the participants are shown together with the codes of the participants'.

Figure 2. Several Examples of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Symbols Encountered

Figure 3. Several Examples of Sports Club Symbols Encountered

Among all the symbols encountered; 5.87% of them refers to Beşiktaş football club, 5.87% of them refer to Fenerbahçe football club and 4.99% percent of them refer to Galatasaray football club, adding this the 1.76% of the symbols that refer to the other football clubs, sports club symbol usage with the 18.5% ratio is beyond even Turkish Flag usage. Except for the symbols listed in Table 2; a total of 21 symbols that refer to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Current president of The Republic of Turkey) and the Justice and Development Party, a total of 13 symbols refer to socialist ideology and a total of 28 symbols that are declarations of vocation/education have been encountered. In addition, also symbols refer to Turkish and Kurdish nationalism/ethnicity with significant ratios have been encountered. Figure 4 shows all 341 symbols as grouped in the categories of "political symbols", "sports club symbols", "educational declarations" and "vocational declarations.

As is seen, political symbol usage of Turkish Twitter users is pretty intense. Moreover, this part of the study revealed that Twitter users do not only use single kind of symbol, while they may both use different political symbols together to express their political stances, or use political, sports club, vocational, and educational symbols together to express (or disclose) their personalities/identities.

Figure 4. Categorical Distributions of the Symbols Encountered

6.2. Personality or Identity Disclosure on Twitter

The symbols, which refer to cultural, political, religious, ethnic groups, on SNS or Twitter profile pages could be analyzed considering Sennett's concept of "personality/identity disclosure" or Habermas' ideas about private interests are not public. These symbols have been demonstrated in the section before. Recall that, "personality disclosure" problem is also about "anonymity." In this regard, Table 3 shows how many of the participants use their real photographs on their profile pages and how many of them are anonymous, associatively with the sample groups they have been selected.

Table 3. Participants Who Are Anonymous or Use Their Real Photographs

Participants	SAMPLE GROUPS (Newspaper Accounts)								SUM	
	Hürriyet		Y. Akit		Sözcü		BirGün			
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Anonymous	11	33.3	13	40.6	11	33.3	12	35.3	47	36.4
Use Their Real Photographs	22	66.7	19	59.4	22	66.7	22	64.7	85	64.4
SUM	33	100	32	100	33	100	34	100	132	100

At first glance at Table 3, while roughly one-third of the participants have an anonymous profile, remaining 85 participants use their real photographs on their profile pages. Table 3 also shows that there is no significant difference between

sample groups in the means of anonymity; roughly one-third of each sample group consists of anonymous participants, and each of the four sample groups shares approximately quarters of the anonymous or non-anonymous participants. Turkish Twitter users are more prone to navigate this cyber-space with their real faces, names, and identities.

As it is mentioned; presentation of the real photographs or the real names does not need to mean the presentation or disclosure of the identity, therefore presentation of the identity via symbols should also be considered. Here, the symbol categories of the study become crucial; as you may recall, the participants who do not have any symbols presented before on their profile pages are called as "Participants without Symbols", and the remaining participants are called as "Participants with At Least One Symbol." Table 4 shows the count of the participants that designed their profile pages with or without symbols associatively with the sample groups they have been selected. The equality between sample groups that occurred in the anonymity category has been broken in the symbol categories.

Table 4. The Participant Count With and Without Symbols

Participants		Sample Groups (Newspaper Accounts)				SUM
		Hürriyet	Yeni Akit	Sözcü	BirGün	
With At Least One Symbol	F	22	28	27	31	108
	%	20.37	25.93	25.00	28.70	100
		66.67	87.50	81.82	91.18	81.82
Without Symbols	F	11	4	6	3	24
	%	45.83	16.67	25.00	12.50	100
		33.33	12.50	18.18	8.82	18.18
Sum	F	33	32	33	34	132
	%	100	100	100	100	100

As is seen from Table 4, Roughly one third of the participants that follow Hürriyet's Twitter account does not use symbols on their profile pages, on the other hand, 91% of the participants that follow Birgün's Twitter account, 87.5% of the participants that follow Yeni Akit's Twitter Account, and 81% of the participants that follow Birgün's Twitter account, 87.5% of the participants that follow Sözcü's Twitter Account have at least one symbol on their profile pages. Almost half of the participants without symbols (45.8%) consisted of the followers of Hürriyet's Twitter account. The

participants who follow the Twitter account of Hürriyet, which represents a more "public" domain, revealed their non-disclosing characters.

While Table 3 and 4 showed that 64.4% of the participants have their real photographs and 81.8% of them have at least one "symbol" on their profile pages; Table 5 approaches these two categories correlatively. The most remarkable finding shown in Table 5 is the participants who do not have any symbol on their profile pages mostly use their real photographs with a significant ratio of 83.3%. Although these participants do not hesitate to disclose their real identities (their real names and faces), they do not disclose their personalities, identities, social groups, that is to say, "with whom they are together."

Table 5. Anonymity of Participants That Uses Symbols and Without Symbols

Participants	Use Their Real Photograph		Anonymous		Sum	
	F	%	F	%	F	%
With At Least One Symbol	65	60.2	43	39.8	108	100
Without Symbols	20	83.3	4	16.6	24	100
SUM	85		47		132	

Nevertheless, 39.8% of the participants with at least one symbol on their profile pages, who disclose their personalities, social groups, "with whom they are together" mostly hide their "real" identity. To extend the analysis, participants have also been categorized as "Political Stance Declarers", "Sports Club Supporters" and "Vocational/Educational Declarers" considering the symbol groups they choose to design their profile pages. It should be noted that; Twitter users can use these three symbol groups together in their profile pages, therefore, to match each participant with a single category; 1- Political symbols are accepted superior to the sports club and vocational/educational symbols, and 2- Sports club symbols are accepted superior to the vocational/educational symbols. Table 6 shows the participant distribution according to the identity categories mentioned above associatively with the sample groups they have been selected.

Table 6. Distribution of the Participants by Simple Identity Categorization

Participants		Hürriyet F	Hürriyet %	Y. Akit F	Y. Akit %	Sözcü F	Sözcü %	BirGün F	BirGün %	Sum F	Sum %
With At Least One Symbol	Political Stance Declarers	14	42.4 / 18.2	22	68.8 / 28.6	20	60.6 / 26.0	20	58.8 / 27.3	76	57.6 / 100
With At Least One Symbol	Sports Club Supporters	1	3.0 / 6.3	3	9.4 / 18.7	4	12.1 / 25.0	8	23.5 / 50.0	16	12.1 / 100
With At Least One Symbol	Vocational /Educational Declarers	7	21.3 / 43.8	3	9.4 / 18.8	3	9.1 / 18.8	3	8.8 / 18.8	16	12.1 / 100
Without Symbols		11	33.3 / 45.8	4	12.5 / 16.7	6	18.2 / 25.0	3	8.8 / 12.5	24	18.2 / 100
Sum		33	100	32	100	33	100	34	100	132	100

Sample Groups (Newspaper Accounts)

In Table 6, it can be seen that more than a half (57.6%) of the participants disclose their political stances. More than half of each sample group except Hürriyet newspaper consist of political stance declarer participants and the ratio increases in 68% for the Yeni Akit sample group. On the other hand, encountering 45.8% of the vocational/educational declarer participants among the participants who follow the Hürriyet newspaper is remarkable.

Table 7. Anonymity of the Participants by Simple Identity Categorization

Participants		With Real Photographs F	With Real Photographs %	Anonymous F	Anonymous %	Sum F	Sum %
With At Least One Symbol	Political Stance Declarers	38	50.0	38	50.0	76	100
With At Least One Symbol	Sports Club Supporters	13	81.3	3	18.8	16	100
With At Least One Symbol	Vocational /Educational Declarers	14	87.5	2	12.5	16	100
Without Symbols		20	83.3	4	16.6	24	100

Table 7 approaches anonymity categories and the categories mentioned above correlatively. It can be seen that 87.5% of the participants who are vocational/educational declarers and 81.3% of the participants who are sports club

supporters use their real photographs on their profile pages. In other words, these participants seem to disclose both their real –formal– identities and personalities, selves, social groups, "with whom they are together" on Twitter's cyber public sphere. However, considering vocational/educational declarations determine "status" rather than "identity" or community belonging, and supporting a sports club does not precisely determine a community (except fanaticism and hooliganism), this finding may not be unexpected. Simply put, these participants actually carry their offline identities, real faces, names, professions, "hobbies" to online, similar to the Boyd and Ellison's narrative, without disclosing their personalities, social groups, communities. However, this is reversed for the participants who declares their political stances, as shown in Table 7, half of the political stance declarer participants are anonymous. These users consider "with whom they are together" more significant than "who they are", put their communal or social group identities ahead. Worries of "personality disclosure" still seems to be valid for SNSs and particularly for Twitter. When the data in Table 7 are calculated, the proportions in Figure 5 emerge.


Figure 5. Personality/Identity Disclosure Rates

In figure 5; participants who are not only anonymous but also have at least one symbol on their profile pages categorized as "Full Disclosing", participants who are not anonymous but have at least one symbol on their profile pages are categorized as "Semi-Disclosing", and remaining participants who are not anonymous and do not have any symbols on their profile pages are categorized as "Non-Disclosing." As is seen, the proportion of participants navigating the "streets of Twitter" with their "social masks" is only 3%, however, roughly one third of the participants put the "rigid and still community masks" even ahead their own faces, and 80.9% of them have political symbols.

6.3. Voluntary Ghettoization on Twitter

In the middle of the 2000's the environment of the internet, similar to the 20th-century city, got crowded, overflow with the anonymous "strangers", and the users chose to become "intimate" and "local" to escape from strangers and alienation as Sennett and Bauman claimed. In other words, for the internet users, the "security need" mentioned by Alver re-emerged, and the solution was choosing to "live" among the similar ones again. As Van Dijk claimed. Seeking for familiarity among the stranger means seeking "people of us", and finding those of us could only be possible when they disclose "with whom they are", and this process often functions on a symbolic domain of profile pages. As revealed in previous chapters, Twitter meticulously chose the symbols to disclose themselves.

In this section of the study; according to reveal whether the symbols used by the participants on their profile pages attract users that are similar to them, it has been examined that how many followers of the participants from different categories use similar symbols on their profile pages. Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to extend the "Political Stance Declarers" category that covers 57.6% of the participants by considering different political stances of Turkey such as; "Republican Nationalists", "Conservative Nationalists"*, "Mere Nationalists", "Turkish Nationalism and Ethnicity", "Kurdish Nationalism and Ethnicity", "Socialists/Anarchists", "Islamic Religionists", and to match each participant to a single category according to the multiple symbol groups they used. Several examples of multiple symbol user participants categorized as "Conservative Nationalists" are shown in Figure 6.

For instance, the participant A18 has both a Turkish Flag and a coat of arm of the sports club he/she supports in her/his cover photograph, and also he/she express that he/she owns a more conservative political stance by using a Mehmed the Conqueror* image in her/his profile photo. The symbolic front designed by A26 that consists of a Turkish Flag, an Ottoman Signature, an Oghuz Khan** portrait and the writings of "Muslim" and "Turk" is similar to A18's profile page. Table 8 lists the distributions of all participants by the categories mentioned above. In Table 8, it is seen that 22.2% of participants are Republican Nationalists, and 17.6% of them disclose their Conservative

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* Republican Nationalist category includes participants that define themselves as republican, nationalist, Kemalist, secular or social democrat, while Conservative Nationalist category includes participants that often define themselves as nationalist and religious. Republicans are mostly represented by The Republican People's Party, while conservatives are mostly represented by the Justice and Development Party.

* Fatih Sultan Mehmet or Mehmet II, 7th Ottoman Sultan who conquered Constantinople.

** Is a legendary and semi-mythological khan of the Turks.

Nationalist political stance. These ratios are above all other categories and followed by the Sports Club Supporter participants with the ratio of 14.8%.

Figure 6. Multiple Symbol Usage Examples by the "Conservative Nationalists"

Another significant finding shown in Table 8 is that the multiple symbol usage in almost every political stance declaration category is more common than singular symbol usage. In addition, Islamic Religionist participants cover the lowest percentage, which means the symbols that refer to Islam religion are often used with the symbols that refer to political declarations, especially by the conservative nationalist participants. Although not shown in Table 8, distributions of participants through each complex identity category have also been analyzed according to the sample groups they have been selected from. For instance, 33.3% of the republican nationalist participants follow the Sözcü journal and 45.8% of them follow the Birgün newspaper. On the other hand, 57.9% of the conservative nationalist participants, roughly one-third of the Islamic religionist participants, and 42.9% of the participants that have been matched with the Turkish nationalism and ethnicity category follow the Yeni Akit newspaper. This strict polarization may be acknowledged as another indication of the cyber voluntary ghettoization.

Table 8. Distributions of Participants by the Complex Identity Categories

Participants With At Least One Symbol By Complex Identity Categories		Count		Percentage	
Republican Nationalists	Mere **Mustafa Kemal Atatürk** symbols	7	24	6.48	**22.2**
	Mere **Republican People's Party** symbols	1		0.93	
	Multiple symbol usage that refer to category.	16		14.8	
Mere Nationalists	Mere **Turkish Flag**	5	9	4.63	**8.33**
	Multiple symbol usage that refer to category.	4		3.70	
Conservative Nationalists	Mere **Justice and Development Party**	2	19	1.85	**17.6**
	Ottomanists	2		1.85	
	Multiple symbol usage that refer to category.	15		13.9	
Sports Club Supporters	Mere the symbols that refer to **Sports Clubs**	13	16	12.0	**14.8**
	Symbols that refer to **Sports Clubs** and vocational/ educational declarations.	3		2.77	
Socialists, Anarchists With vocational/educational declarations.		8		7.41	
Islamic Religionists	Mere symbols that refer to **Islam Religion**	2	3	1.85	**2.78**
	Symbols that refer to **Islam Religion** and vocational/ educational declarations.	1		0.93	
Turkish Nationalism and Ethnicity		7		6.48	
Kurdish Nationalism and Ethnicity		8		7.41	
Mere **Vocational Declerations**		5		4.63	
Mere **Educational Declerations**		9		8.33	
Sum		108		100	

In this part of the study, the sample was not used entirely, and it has been reduced by selecting 34 of the participants to make the follower counting easier. This reduction has been made by considering the number of the participants matched the complex identity categories shown in Table 8. From each category, a minimum of 25% of the participants has been selected providing no fewer than 3 participants. Then all

followers of the selected participants have been scanned and each of the followers has been matched with one of the same complex identity categories, in associated with the symbols they use. In addition, "Institutional" category to distinguish institutional and corporal accounts, and "Other" category to distinguish the accounts which cannot be categorized was added to the follower categorization. Participants' followers consist of an average of 12.1% "institutional" and 8.6% "other" accounts. These categories have been excluded from the analysis. Table 9 shows the average follower distributions of participants do not use politic symbols.

Table 9. Mean Follower Distributions of Participants Do not Use Politic Symbols

Participants By Complex Identity Categories		Follower Counts by Identity Categories									SUM
		Politic Followers				Non–Politic Followers					
		Common Politic									
		Republican Nationalists	Mere Nationalists	SUM	Other Politic	Sports Club Supporters	Vocational Declarers	Educational Declarers	Without Symbols	SUM	
Sports Club Supporters	F	37	20	57	29	90	25	23	188	326	412
	%	9.0	4.9	13.8	7.0	21.8	6.1	5.6	45.6	79.1	100
Vocational/ Educational Declarers	F	27	24	51	44	34	42	39	255	370	465
	%	5.8	5.2	11.0	9.5	7.3	9.0	8.4	54.8	79.6	100
Without Symbols	F	68	49	117	93	131	73	100	795	1099	1309
	%	5.2	3.7	8.9	7.1	10.0	5.6	7.6	60.7	84.0	100
Sum	F			225	166					1795	2186
	%			10.3	7.6					82.1	100

The "common politic" column in Table 9 contains two politic categories which the participants are most followed by, and it is remarkable that these categories are the same for all non–politic participants. On the other hand, participants do not use politic symbols on their profile pages are mostly followed by users who do not also use politic symbols with 82.1%. Table 10 shows the average follower distributions of participants use politic symbols.

Table 10. Mean Follower Distributions of Participants Use Politic Symbols

Participants By Complex Identity Categories		Follower Counts By Identity Categories									Sum
		Politic Followers				Non–Politic Followers					
		Similar			Other						
Republican Nationalists		Republican Nationalists	Mere Nationalists	SUM		Sports Club Supporters	Vocational Declarers	Educational Declarers	Without Symbols	SUM	
	F	193	55	248	58	140	69	43	487	739	**1045**
	%	18.5	5.3	23.7	5.6	13.4	6.6	4.1	46.6	70.7	**100**
Conservative Nationalists		Conservative Nationalists	Islamic Religionists	SUM		Sports Club Supporters	Vocational Declarers	Educational Declarers	Without Symbols	SUM	
	F	308	103	411	118	71	44	13	158	286	**815**
	%	37.8	12.6	50.4	14.5	8.7	5.4	1.6	19.4	35.1	**100**
Turkish Nationalists / Ethnicity		Turkish Nationalists	Republican Nationalists	SUM		Sports Club Supporters	Vocational Declarers	Educational Declarers	Without Symbols	SUM	
	F	112	39	151	59	6	32	7	66	111	**321**
	%	34.9	12.1	47.0	18.4	1.9	10.0	2.2	20.6	34.6	**100**
Kurdish Nationalists / Ethnicity		Kurdish Nationalists	Socialist / Anarchist	SUM		Sports Club Supporters	Vocational Declarers	Educational Declarers	Without Symbols	SUM	
	F	108	43	151	21	5	27	5	159	196	**368**
	%	29.3	11.7	41.0	5.7	1.4	7.3	1.4	43.2	53.3	**100**
Socialists / Anarchists		Socialists / Anarchists	Kurdish Nationalists	SUM		Sports Club Supporters	Vocational Declarers	Educational Declarers	Without Symbols	SUM	
	F	60	16	76	32	21	26	27	245	319	**427**
	%	14.1	3.7	17.8	7.5	4.9	6.1	6.3	57.4	74.7	**100**
Sum	F			1037	288					1651	2976
	%			**34.8**	**9.7**					**55.6**	**100**

The "Similar Politic" column in Table 10 contains followers from the same politic category and the second politic category that the participants are most followed by.

Looking at these two categories, the participants have followers that are remarkably similar political stances with them. Moreover, unlike the participants who do not use politic symbols, political stance declarer participants are mostly followed again by political stance declarers. The findings in Tables 9 and 10 are visualized in Figure 7.


Figure 7. Mean Follower Distributions of the Participants

As seen in Figure 7, conservative nationalist and Turkish nationalist participants desire to "live" in a "secure" political neighborhood (or network), where only the people similar to them live, as Alver and Van Dijk claim. It is also obvious that republican nationalist and socialist/anarchist participants have regularly "purge" users that declare different political stances that follow them, as Bauman noted. Moreover, Kurdish nationalist participants both form networks that consist of "familiar" users and "purge" strangers. On the contrary, participants who do not disclose their political stances "live" among the users who often wear their "social masks", remarkably away from ghetto-like networks, where they create "significations" with social interactions "naturally."

7. Conclusion

This study, which perceived the SNSs and Twitter as urban spaces where social interactions take place, also perceived the homogeneous networks that the users form as "voluntary ghettos" rather than "echo-chambers." Aiming to describe the relationship between "cyber ghettoization" and "self-disclosure", which is acknowledged as disclosure of cultural, political, or ethnic identities by the symbols that refer to them, in the study first the symbols encountered are documented, therefore, it is determined that the symbols that refer to political stances (i.e. Turkish

Flag, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) are commonly used by Turkish users. Thereafter, examining the self-disclosure rates, it is revealed that while roughly one-third of the users have anonymous profile pages, 81.8% of the users have at least one symbol on their profile pages. Finally, when the cyber voluntary ghettos are examined, it is obvious that, the participants, who disclose the "political" side of their identity/personality, their "intimacy", often chose to be "local", form a kind of voluntary ghetto by attracting "familiar" users who have the same political stances with them, just as Sennett and Bauman are worried about. For sure, these attempts may also be interpreted as "visibility" attempts, since republican and conservative nationalist participants try to "excel" or socialist/anarchist and Kurdish nationalist participants may be acknowledged as "subaltern" groups. However, in a homogeneous ghetto-like network, which is the exact opposite of "public", excellence or visibility struggles would be insignificant. On the contrary, the participants who do not disclose their political stances, "live" remarkably away from ghetto-like networks where they create "significations" by social interactions.

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